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INTRODUCTION
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Daniel L. Nielson1 & Bradley Parks2 &
Michael J. Tierney2
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# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017
Every year, states and international organizations (IOs) provide somewhere between
$120 and $170 billion in official development finance (ODF) to recipient countries. IOs
are typically responsible for about one-third of global ODF, with sovereign govern-
ments providing the remainder.1 The fact that IO development finance comes from
many countries acting jointly distinguishes it from bilateral development finance. IOs
typically aggregate the preferences and resources of multiple member states in the
pursuit of a collective policy among their own ranks and toward other countries.
This means that development finance from international organizations repre-
sents a distinct institutional form of aid-giving and lending that stands apart from
bilateral financing. The multilateral nature of IO development finance – requiring
member governments to negotiate and agree upon shared policies – may alter the
underlying politics and motivations driving multilateral aid as compared to
bilateral aid. But is assistance from international organizations actually different
in its causes and consequences? Does divergence in institutional form lead to
differences in content and function? Are the underlying motivations of IOs truly
distinct from their bilateral counterparts? Does IO development finance have
different effects on recipients? 2 And how are new governance arrangements
Rev Int Organ (2017) 12:157–169
DOI 10.1007/s11558-017-9270-7
1These summary statistics are based on the OECD’s definitions and measurements of ODF over 1985–2015 period
and estimated missing flows that are not captured in OECD statistics. See Tierney et al. (2011), Strange et al.
(2017) and OECD statistics at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm.
2For existing empirical studies that compare the effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral development
finance, see Ram (2003, 2004), Headey (2008), Minoiu and Reddy (2007, 2010), Alvi and Aberra (2012), and
Kizhakethalackal et al. (2013). Gulrajani (2016) provides a useful review of the literature on the distinctive
features of multilateral development finance and how it has changed over the past decade.
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at multilateral agencies, such as the inclusion of non-state actors on governing
boards and the increasing use of trust funds, likely to shape the allocation and
the effects of IO development finance going forward?
Scholars have made progress answering some of these questions, but many empir-
ical and theoretical issues remain unresolved. At least three challenges have constrained
research on IO development finance. First, data coverage on development finance has
been primarily limited to time-series–cross-section statistics covering organizations by
year. These data usually fail to capture the nuances of how money flows from member
governments and debt markets to the IOs themselves and then on to recipient govern-
ments, private contractors, and non-governmental organizations before reaching the
nominal beneficiaries of aid. Do these long and multifaceted chains of delegation
differentiate multilateral financing from the bilateral baseline in any meaningful or
consequential ways? Can more complete and accurate data coverage of these flows
increase our understanding of the politics and the effects of IO development finance?
Second, data on IO development finance have generally been aggregated broadly
across sectors, geographies, distribution channels, implementation partners, and finan-
cial modalities, among other things. This reliance on highly aggregated data likely
results in important inferential errors that greater granularity, local specificity, and
tracking of delivery channels would reveal. Do international organizations target aid
by sector or geography in ways that are similar to or different from bilateral donors?
Are the paths by which money gets channeled to recipients similar? Are the fiduciary,
social, and environmental standards followed by bilateral and multilateral suppliers of
development finance substantially different? Are multilateral institutions any better
than bilateral institutions at providing useful analytical and advisory support to their
in-country partners? Have the sectors or geographic targets of IO assistance changed
over time? Answering these questions requires more disaggregated data on both
multilateral and bilateral financial flows.
Third, the nature of the aid enterprise often limits the methods that can be used
to acquire new knowledge. While several development organizations, including
the World Bank, have made random assignment of development interventions a
priority within specific countries and sectors in order to evaluate programs and
obtain precise estimates of causal effects, random assignment of all aid across
countries has not been and almost certainly never will be seriously considered.
This fact limits most empirical inquiry to observational research, making causal
estimation of aid effectiveness more difficult, and complicating efforts to under-
stand whether, when, and how aid from different types of donors lead to different
results on the ground. Do multilateral donors allocate aid differently? Does IO aid
have different intended or unintended effects on the nominal beneficiaries of aid
when compared to bilateral flows? Do these beneficiaries perceive IO aid as more
or less valuable compared to bilateral assistance? New applications of experimen-
tal methods and econometric techniques that aim to isolate the causal effects of
different interventions hold some promise in answering these questions.
The articles in this special issue address all three of these challenges in by
improving data coverage, employing more granular data, or using new methods to
answer the types of questions articulated above. But before summarizing the contri-
butions in this special issue, we first describe the ways in which development finance
from international organizations differs in form from traditional bilateral aid.We then
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elaborate on the three research challenges introduced above and describe how the
political economy literature has started to make progress in addressing these
challenges.
1 The distinctiveness of multilateral development finance
An important share of development finance from international organizations goes to
recipient countries in the form of grants that the beneficiaries do not repay. Many IOs,
including most of the specialized UN agencies, provide their development assistance in
the form of grants. In terms of endowments without repayment, then, these grants look
very similar to most bilateral assistance.
However, the process of grant allocation from multilateral organizations can look very
different in practice when compared to allocation from bilateral agencies. This stems largely
from the collective decision-making that characterizes the multilateral financial institutions
(Nielson and Tierney 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006; Copelovitch 2010). In most IOs that
provide development assistance, member governments are comprised of both wealthier
donor countries and poorer recipient countries whose representatives jointly bargain,
coalesce, and vote on policies that guide aid allocation and/or on specific proposals for
development projects and programs (Lyne et al. 2006, 2009;Murphy 2006). In institutional
form this contrasts with bilateral aid agencies, which make unilateral decisions over their
aid portfolios while consulting minimally – despite consistent calls from development
advocates for greater coordination –with agencies from other donor countries. So, there are
key differences in process between bilateral and multilateral development assistance.
However, when it comes to multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the
World Bank and the various regional development banks, which provide the majority
of IO development finance, there are also differences in the types of financial instru-
ments that are employed. MDBs provide no-interest loans with relatively minor fees
and very long (often 50-year) payback schedules of which only the principal needs to
be repaid. The most well known of these institutions is the International Development
Association (IDA) at the World Bank, but each regional development bank has a
similar lending window that provides no-interest or very low-interest loans. Since
principal amounts are repaid with currency that is usually inflating – even if only
modestly – over time, these financial instruments are very attractive to recipients. Often
referred to as the Bsoft windows^ at the development banks, these exceedingly con-
cessional loans are effectively grants and are referenced as such at the MDBs.
And finally, in addition to grants, the development banks also issue low-interest
loans to borrowers from their Bhard windows.^ For decades the rates on these loans
have significantly undercut what many borrower countries could obtain from commer-
cial lenders in global debt markets. Thus, due to their historically low interest rates, for
decades the grant elements on these MDB loans exceeded the 25% threshold that
qualify them as official development assistance (ODA).3 There are many variations on
3 The relative attractiveness of borrowing from these Bhard windows^ at the MDBs has declined in recent
years due, in part, to historically low global interest rates. What were traditionally the MDB’s largest
borrowers now have more sovereign borrowing options and can sometimes acquire loans on similar terms
from commercial banks (Humphrey 2014).
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the themes of these financial instruments, and the contributions to this special issue
explore their different aspects. But it is important to emphasize that financial instru-
ments differ significantly across IO development agencies.4
The distinctiveness of the MDBs’ soft- and hard-window assistance compared to
conventional aid (e.g., grants) brings with it different political and financing demands.
The soft windows at the MDBs have traditionally been funded primarily by periodic
allocations from member governments. However, more recently, MDBs have chosen to
leverage their AAA bond ratings on international debt markets to supplement funding
for the no-interest soft-window loans to their poorest members (Mayeda 2016). The
MDB hard windows are entirely funded by bond floats leveraging member-government
capital subscriptions. Chris Humphrey (2017) describes this financing dynamic in his
contribution to this special issue. As he explains, changes in sources of funding alter
political incentives, and thus the lending patterns of the MDBs.
BMulti-bi^ development assistance is another increasingly important type of IO
development finance that has surged in recent years (Eichenauer and Reinsberg
2017). For these mostly grant-funded projects, individual governments, or small groups
of member governments, provide Bearmarked^ financing to MDBs in the form of trust
funds that are designed to address specific issues. Employing financing from these trust
funds, MDB staffs negotiate, design, and implement projects in recipient countries
according to the directives of the trust-fund owners rather than the entire membership
represented on the Bank boards. These financial mechanisms loosen, or bypass entirely,
the traditional governance structures at the MDBs and introduce their own distinctive
political dynamics where trust fund owners have more control over allocation than they
do core funding from the same MDB.
In addition to grants and loans, multilateral institutions provide substantial and
increasing amounts of financing (e.g., loans, guarantees, and equity investment) and
risk insurance to private companies in the developing world and to private companies
in Western countries willing to invest in developing countries. A growing chorus of
policymakers and thought leaders are now calling upon multilateral development
institutions to ramp up their support to the private sector in order to facilitate the
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (e.g., Savoy et al. 2016).5 These
forms of support to private sector entities are supposed to serve different purposes than
the support that multilateral development institutions provide to public sector and non-
profit entities – for example, by encouraging companies to pursue investment activities
that they might not otherwise pursue through the provision of risk insurance. However,
the factors that guide the cross-national and sub-national allocation of such financial
flows are understudied and poorly understood. 6 Likewise, the economic, social,
4 While none of the contributions to this special issue address the role of MIGA, the IFC or other multilateral
organizations designed to incentivize private investments in developing countries, these kinds of institutions
are an increasingly important part of the multilateral organizational effort to promote development. For recent
work that does address the role of these institutions in the area of development finance see Girishankar (2009),
Mason and Asher (2010), Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011).
5 Willem te Velde (2011) estimate that these amounts fluctuate between $15 billion and $33 billion a year
during the 2000s.
6 In principle, these types of financing are supposed to support economic development in countries with
limited access to capital markets.
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environmental, and political effects of these flows represent a major blind spot in the
empirical literature on IO development finance (as we discuss below).
The distinctive political dynamics that are at work within multilateral development
finance institutions have been difficult to study given the limitations noted above
relating to data coverage, data aggregation, and research methods. Below we discuss
each of these elements in greater depth. As we shift to this discussion, we note that the
contributions to this special issue do not advance strikingly new theories or paradigms,
but instead apply both conventional and novel methods and evidence to address
enduring empirical and theoretical questions in the study of foreign aid and develop-
ment finance.
2 Data coverage
An important question in the study of IO development finance is whether and where
data coverage is sufficiently complete and accurate to enable rigorous empirical inquiry.
Consider the private sector financing and risk mitigation activities of IOs. Publicly
available data on the private sector lending and insurance activities of multilateral and
bilateral development finance institutions are extremely sparse due to concerns held by
private sector clients about the disclosure of commercially-sensitive information that
would undermine their competitiveness. As such, it has proven to be particularly
challenging for scholars of IO development finance to make significant knowledge
gains in this area.7
Another key challenge for scholars of IO development finance is the issue of
whether the entities with de jure responsibility for monitoring global development
finance activities can keep pace with de facto changes in the global development
finance regime. Researchers have historically drawn inferences about the allocation
and effects of IO development finance based on data that were made available through
a voluntary disclosure regime (e.g., the OECD-DAC). This reliance on voluntarily
disclosed data was relatively unproblematic when regime compliance was high and
when almost all donors were members of the OECD. However, the international
development finance regime is currently undergoing a period of unprecedented tumult,
with a growing number of non-Western states contesting or opting out of the existing
rules and institutions that were designed after World War II (by a group of Western
states with relatively homogenous preferences and values) to facilitate coordination and
promote a shared approach to development (Hook and Rumsey 2016; Muchapondwa
et al. 2016; Dreher et al. forthcoming).8
7 The largest multilateral institutions that provide such financing are the International Finance Corporation, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank. Their largest
bilateral counterparts are the German Investment Corporation, the UK’s Commonwealth Development
Corporation (CDC), France’s Promotion and Participation for Economic Cooperation (PROPARCO), and
the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO). However, there are many other bilateral institutions
engaged in the provision of such financing.
8 Recent challenges to the prevailing international order include China’s recent efforts to coordinate emerging
powers through the BRICS summits and G-20 meetings and to spearhead the creation of two new
international financial institutions of their own: the New Development Bank and the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (Biswas 2015).
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This period of tumult has two major implications for empirically-oriented re-
searchers. First, for a growing number of multilateral development finance suppliers,
there are either no data or insufficiently complete and accurate data. The AIIB and the
New Development Bank are obvious cases in point, but even the EBRD had no
comprehensive publicly available project level data until 2010 (Tierney et al. 2011).
Second, a growing number of bilateral donors and lenders refuse to disclose detailed
information about their overseas activities (e.g., China Development Bank, China Ex-
IM Bank, the Brazilian Development Bank, the Development Bank of Southern Africa,
the Industrial Development Bank of India, Vnesheconombank, Russian Regional
Development Bank, and the Export Development Bank of Iran), so inasmuch as
researchers wish to study the distinctiveness of IO development finance by comparing
it to bilateral development finance, this type of comparative analysis will become more
rather than less difficult in the coming years. The Brazys et al. (2017) contribution to
this volume, which compares the local corruption effects of World Bank projects and
Chinese projects (using the new open source AidData-TUFF method to identify the
latter as explained in Strange et al. 2017), represents one example of how researchers
can work around this increasingly binding constraint. However, many more efforts of
this type will be needed going forward to ensure that knowledge accumulation about IO
development finance (and its distinctiveness) does not slow or degrade over time
because of growing informational scarcity.
Other missing data challenges that scholars of IO development finance increasingly
face relate to trust funds, pass-along funds, and the flow of money from multilateral
organizations to contractors and from contractors to recipients. In this regard, the
Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017), McLean (2017), and Reinsberg (2017) contributions
to this special issue represent important attempts to provide more complete and accurate
data coverage of IO development finance flows and thus improve our collective
understanding of the politics and the effects of such flows. However, IO scholars
cannot afford to rest on their laurels; substantially more effort will be needed in the
future to ensure that the most important questions about the causes and consequences of
IO development finance are empirically tractable. Answering these questions will
require more and better data coverage.
3 Data aggregation
The contributions to this special issue represent a broader trend in empirical research on
the causes and consequences of bilateral and multilateral development finance. For
decades the empirical literature aggregated data across dissimilar sources and types of
development finance and employed cross-national regression methods in an effort to
gauge the nation-wide impact of these financial transfers on aggregated outcomes such
as national economic growth or measures of national poverty. In the past decade
research has shifted towards new forms of analysis that unbundle development projects
into their constituent parts and exploit more granular variation, such as sectoral
variation in aid projects (Clemens et al. 2011; Hicks et al. 2008), in-country geographic
dispersion of the interventions supported by development projects (Findley et al. 2011),
educational training and professional backgrounds of development project managers
(Chwieroth 2013), behavioral and ascriptive characteristics of project implementers
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(Denizer et al. 2013), levels and types of due diligence applied during project prepa-
ration (Kilby 2015), levels and types of oversight placed on project supervision and
performance measurement (Honig 2016), and varying channels of delivery and agents
of implementation (Dietrich 2013). These disaggregated measures of aid projects,
policy, and personnel enable identification of variation in development outcomes within
targeted regions and sectors, which has been a boon to both researchers who aim to
understand development finance and practitioners who aim to improve development
outcomes.
For example, the Brazys et al. (2017) contribution to this special issue is represen-
tative of a broader Bgeospatial turn^ in aid research that leverages subnational sources
of variation to better understand the motivations for and impacts of international
development finance (Winters 2014; Dreher and Lohmann 2015; Nunnenkamp et al.
2016a, b; Briggs 2017). With data on the precise locations and timing of specific
interventions funded by bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions and
subnationally geocoded outcome data, the literature is now uncovering new knowledge
about the features of multilateral development finance that are truly distinctive. This
approach has produced new insights about how multilateral development finance is
geographically targeted within countries (Öhler and Nunnenkamp 2014; Briggs 2017;
Nunnenkamp et al. 2017) and how these targeting practices differ in consequential
ways from the practices of bilateral donors (Dreher et al. 2016). This work also
identifies important differences in how multilateral donors coordinate their activities
as compared to bilateral donors (Nunnenkamp et al. 2016a, b).
This geo-spatial turn has also led to a new set of aid effectiveness studies that seek to
achieve causal identification with finer-grained data on the geographical scope and
timing of specific interventions and (both intended and unintended) outcomes that are
measured on similar spatial and temporal scales (Dreher and Lohmann 2015; Campbell
et al. 2016; Marty et al. 2017). Several of these studies have presented evidence that
bilateral and multilateral sources of development finance can have substantially differ-
ent impacts on economic, environmental, and governance outcomes (Dreher et al.
2016; Buchanan et al. 2016; BenYishay et al. 2016; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2016).
The use of more disaggregated data has also generated new insights about the project-
specific factors that facilitate and impede the successful implementation of development
projects. At theWorld Bank, new evidence suggests that roughly 20% of the variation in
project outcomes can be explained by cross-country differences and 80% of the variation
in project outcomes can be explained by within-country variation (Denizer et al. 2013).
Some of the project-level factors that seem to matter include levels of effort devoted to
project preparation (Kilby 2015; Bulman et al. forthcoming), the quality of project
design (Lodewijk et al. 2013), characteristics of the organizations and the personnel
responsible for project management and implementation (Denizer et al. 2013; Farrell
2016; Limodio 2016), and the strength of project monitoring and evaluation systems
(Legovini et al. 2015; Moll et al. 2015; Raimondo 2016; Buntaine et al. forthcoming).
Yet, relatively little is known about whether, to what extent, how, and why these
project-level factors that enable and constrain the successful implementation of devel-
opment projects differ between bilateral and multilateral development finance institu-
tions. This is a logical next step for future studies. The growing availability of project-
level outcome data from both bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions
puts this type of analysis within reach (Honig 2016).
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4 Research methods
In addition to limitations on the quality and coverage of observational data, research on
development assistance suffers from challenges in making causal inferences. This
problem is common to many social science fields in which random assignment is
impractical or unethical. Donor governments and international organizations face an
array of political and moral imperatives that make it unlikely that interventions will
ever be assigned at random or even Bas-if-at-random^ on a large scale. Without
randomized experiments or natural experiments, it is difficult to make strong
causal claims since statistical correlations established with observational data
are subject to unobserved or unobservable confounds. While excellent science
can still be accomplished using observational data, social scientists, including
those who study development finance, continue to search for credible causal
identification strategies.
Some studies have sought to employ natural or quasi-experiments to estimate the
causal effects of aid interventions. Some plausible identification strategies or instru-
ments have even been employed in an effort to estimate the effects of international
development finance. Carnegie and Marinov (forthcoming) employ one of the most
creative and credible approaches by making use of the strict rotation of the presidency
of the Council of Europe, in which the presidents in the first six months of the year get
to propose the budget – including aid allocations – and do so while favoring their
former colonies in aid decisions. The authors leveraged this as-if-at-random exogenous
variation to estimate the causal effects of aid on democratization and found a positive
and significant effect. The use of similar as-if-at-random variation provides a promising
approach to questions about multilateral aid allocation.
While randomized experiments likely will not be implemented across the portfolios of
multilateral and bilateral development finance institutions, recent work highlights other
ways to employ experimental methods that can make use of random assignment and
therefore achieve greater internal validity, albeit in more restricted empirical settings. This
is especially the case if one’s research objective is to understand the perceptions of
individual recipient citizens or elites. Findley et al. (2017) provide one such effort in this
special issue, which reflects a growing trend in international development finance research
that uses experiments for causal identification (see Buntaine and Prather 2015; Dietrich
and Winters 2015; Milner et al. 2016; and Harris et al. forthcoming).
5 Contributions to the special issue
Findley et al. (2017) use a survey experiment with behavioral outcomes to under-
stand what features of aid projects shape the perceptions of aid effectiveness in the
minds of both Ugandan citizens and members of the Ugandan national parliament.
The authors randomly assign the named donor for actual aid projects in the
pipeline. This research design illustrates the differences between bilateral and
multilateral donors in the eyes of individuals within recipient countries. The
authors find that there were few meaningful differences for either citizens or MPs
across donors and donor types in their willingness to sign supportive petitions, send
SMS messages, or, for MPs, to send letters to the Ugandan president. These results
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speak more clearly than previous observational research to hypotheses in the
literature on the differences between bilateral, multilateral, and domestic govern-
ment financing of development projects, at least in the minds of recipients on the
ground.
Brazys et al. (2017) use sub-nationally georeferenced observational data to
explore how different sources and types of international development finance
affect local governance outcomes. As noted above, their article is part of a
larger Bgeospatial turn^ in research on development finance. The authors find
that the presence of Chinese development projects in localities within Tanzania
is associated with higher levels of self-reported experiences with corruption by
local residents. However, when World Bank development projects are located in
a given locality, self-reported experiences with corruption are lower. In cases
where Chinese and World Bank projects are physically co-located, however, the
apparent corruption-reducing effect of World Bank aid vanishes. Whether this
finding is robust across other recipient countries and other donors will certainly
be the subject of future research, but this initial finding will no doubt generate
interest in both the research and policy communities where corruption has been
identified as a key constraint on improving developing outcomes.
McLean (2017) employs contract-level data to gain leverage on the puzzle of
multilateral aid allocation. Adopting an informal influence approach (see Stone
2013), she studies the distribution of contracts at the World Bank to learn
whether companies headquartered in either recipient countries or in the coun-
tries of their major bilateral donors have advantages in winning contract bids.
She finds that contracts are indeed granted disproportionately to recipients’
domestic companies and their largest bilateral aid donors. Her contribution, as
we previously noted, is part of a larger effort in the literature to unbundle aid
projects into their constituent parts and study the causes and consequences of
IO development finance at these finer scales.
Humphrey (2017) employs a variety of qualitative methods to reveal what may
be the most striking finding in this special issue – an untold and important story
about Bnew^ external actors that shape the operational lending decisions at the
largest MDBs. This research on the role of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) shows
how extant theoretical approaches, such as principal-agent theory, have understated
the influence of these under-studied actors. More importantly, Humphrey shows
that post-financial crisis changes in the way CRAs calculate the credit risk of MDB
portfolios directly impacts operational decisions at all the major MDBs. So, while
these Bnew^ actors were always relevant for MDBs, they have been undertheorized
in the academic literature and they are increasingly important in the post-2008
world of development finance. Specifically, the ability of staff to focus on the
likely development implications of a project has been reduced and a heightened
focus on the impact of any given loan on the bond rating of the MDB now shapes
both project design and approval at higher levels of management. While members
of MDB management and staff are acutely aware of this change, scholars of IPE in
general and multilateral development finance in particular have been unaware of
this shift. The decisions of CRAs are now likely to have large effects on both
developing country governments and our theories of IO governance, which often
assume stronger accountability to member states than may be warranted. In fact, as
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member governments seek to make their individual investments in MDB conces-
sional windows go further by permitting the sale of bonds to finance operations,9
we are likely to observe an increasing influence on the part of bond markets and
CRAs in particular.
The articles by Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) and Reinsberg (2017) analyze ear-
marked aid in general and Bpass-on funds,^ which are a specific manifestation of ear-
marked aid, respectively. Both papers build upon an impressive new dataset that
documents the four-fold increase over the past 20 years of a hybrid type of develop-
ment finance. Earmarked aid is provided by one or more governments, but is allocated
and implemented by staff from an international organization. Previous research (Lyne
et al. 2006; Hicks et al. 2008; Bayram and Graham 2016) describes an increase in non-
core funding to multilateral development organizations, but until the creation of this
new database, many important research questions on the causes and the consequences
of delegation to multilateral development organizations were not testable with
systematic evidence. Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) show that this type of
earmarked funding has increased steadily over time and that it now constitutes about
20% of all official development finance. Hence, the clear conceptual distinction
between bilateral and multilateral aid described above has become empirically less
clear over time. Why have states and multilateral organizations shifted funding to this
new financial modality and what effects has this modality had on development
organizations and development outcomes?
Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) show that, despite the claims of the governments
that provide these trust funds, the cross-national allocation of these funds looks much
more like bilateral aid than multilateral aid allocated by the same organizations. Further,
states may use earmarked funds for a variety of self-interested purposes for which
multilateral aid financed through core funding is not as useful. Reinsberg (2017) shifts
the focus from government donors of the funds to the strategic goals and behavior of
staff and management within multilateral organizations. When IO staff members need
to identify resources to fund the initiatives for which they are responsible, they often
strike deals with member governments and other units within multilateral organizations
in order to sustain their operations. These political and bureaucratic motivations may
result in less than optimal allocation of aid from a development perspective. Like the
other contributions to this special issue, Eichenauer and Reinsberg use new and
improved evidence to highlight the political economy logic of important outcomes
within multilateral development finance organizations, within donor governments, and
within developing countries.
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